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Abstract. In this paper, I study the nonparametric identification of a mul-
tidimensional adverse selection model. In particular, I consider the screening
model of Rochet and Chone´ (1998), where products have multiple character-
istics and consumers have private information about their multidimensional
taste for these characteristics, and determine the data features and addi-
tional condition(s) that identify model parameters. The parameters include
the nonparametric joint density of consumer taste, the cost function, and
the utility function, and the data includes individual-level data on choices
and prices paid from one market. When the utility is nonlinear in prod-
uct characteristics, however, data from one market is not enough, but with
data from at least two markets, or over two periods, with different marginal
prices is sufficient for identification as long as these price differences are due
to exogenous (and binary) changes in cost and not because the two mar-
kets are inherently different. I also derive all testable conditions for a joint
distribution of observed choices and prices to be rationalized by a model of
multidimensional adverse selection.
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1. Introduction
At least since Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973); and Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), economists have believed that information asymmetry is a universal
phenomenon and that it always results in a significant loss of welfare. This
belief has influenced the design of various regulatory policies; see Baron (1989);
Joskow and Rose (1989); Laffont and Tirole (1993); and Laffont (1994). How-
ever, Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) find no evidence of asymmetric information
in automobile insurance, and Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010) estimate
the welfare loss due to asymmetric information to be insignificant. One reason
for this lack of empirical support for the theory could be that the most widely
used theoretical models for asymmetric information assume one-dimensional
informational asymmetry, while in reality informational asymmetry is multidi-
mensional and cannot be sorted out in a satisfactory manner according to only
one dimension. Ignoring multidimensionality would then lead to incorrect anal-
ysis and flawed welfare conclusion(s).1 Stiglitz (1977) assumes insurees have
private information only about their accident risk, for example, but Finkelstein
and McGarry (2006) and Cohen and Einav (2007) have shown that insurers have
private information about their risk and risk preferences, and if anything, risk
preferences are more likely to be privately known than the risk. Aryal, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2015) study the nonparametric identification of insurance markets
where insurers have asymmetric information about risk and risk preferences.
Most of the literature is focused on insurance and annuities markets; very little
is known about other markets where multidimensionality is potentially equally
important. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this line of research by
studying the identification of a multidimensional adverse selection model, also
known as the multidimensional screening model, which lays the foundation for
estimating such a model.
In particular, I study an environment where a seller sells a product with
multiple characteristics to consumers with heterogeneous taste for each of those
characteristics, similar to Lancaster (1971), but where only the consumer is
privy to her taste profile. The seller knows only the (market-wide) joint density
of the taste profile, and offers a menu of options (product characteristics and
prices) to maximize the expected profit. In equilibrium a seller offers a menu of
options – a configuration of product characteristics and prices – that maximizes
1 It is instructive to note that for third-degree price discrimination, the sufficient condition
for price discrimination to improve social welfare is known (Varian, 1985).
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the expected profit, subject to the truth-telling and participation constraints for
the consumer. Rochet and Chone´ (1998) (henceforth, Rochet-Chone´) showed
that there exists a unique equilibrium, and the (first-order) conditions that
characterize the equilibrium provide mappings from the (unobserved) structural
parameters to the (observed) choices.
I determine the condition(s) under which I can use data on consumer choices
and payments from a single market to nonparametrically identify the joint den-
sity of the taste profile, the cost function, and the (common) utility function
when product characteristics enter the utility function nonlinearly. Identifica-
tion is tantamount to showing that the equilibrium mapping implied by Rochet-
Chone´ is invertible. Even though I use the multiple characteristics interpreta-
tion, the results can be applied to several other environments, such as a multi-
product monopoly and a labor contract for multiple tasks where workers differ
in their task-specific skills.
In a sharp contrast with one-dimensional asymmetric information, with multi-
dimensional asymmetric information, bunching (two distinct types of consumers
choose the same bundle) is inevitable with possibly very different welfare im-
plications. In equilibrium, the seller partitions the consumers’ types into three
categories: the high-types, who are perfectly screened (where each type is of-
fered a unique bundle of qualities); the medium-types, who are further divided
into different categories, where all types of the same category are bunched and
get the same bundle; and the low-types, who are always excluded or offered
the outside option. The identification strategy will depend on whether a type
is high-type or medium-type, and since I use both demand and supply-side
optimality conditions, I can differentiate which are high-types and which are
medium-types. As is pointed out in Subsection 4.1.1, using only the demand
side would lead to incorrect estimate of the joint density of consumer types
because we would not be able to account for the bunching.2 Furthermore, us-
ing the supply side optimality conditions will be useful to identify general and
nonlinear marginal cost function, and not just a constant marginal cost as is
typically the case. (It is also important to contrast this with the literature on
identification of insurance markets (or insurance-like markets, e.g., annuities)
that often use only the demand side. In such markets, the most important cost
component are the claims, which are often observed by the econometricians. So
supply side is not as important for such markets as it is in this paper.)
2 This problem is moot with one-dimensional consumer heterogeneity with no bunching.
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I consider these sub-groups sequentially, first when the product characteris-
tics enter the utility function linearly and, then, when they enter nonlinearly.
Consider the high-types, who are perfectly screened, which means their incen-
tive compatibility constraints are satisfied, which in turn translates into the
restriction that the marginal utility for each characteristic is equal to the mar-
ginal price. With linear utility, marginal utility is nothing but the consumers’
type, and the marginal price is the gradient (slope) of the observed price func-
tion, which identifies the truncated joint density of high-types. Once we identify
the types, I show that we can use the first-order condition that characterizes
optimal allocation rule (a map from types to product characteristics) to non-
parametrically identify the cost function over an appropriate domain.
This identification strategy does not work for other types because they are
bunched. I therefore have to use some other form of exogenous variation. In
particular, I show that we can use variation in the observed consumer char-
acteristics. Suppose there are as many consumer characteristics as product
characteristics that are independent of the consumer types, then I can identify
the truncated joint density of medium-types. The idea behind this strategy is
to represent the conditional choice density for a given consumer characteristic
as a mixture (Radon transform) of truncated density of consumer types, which
is invertible (Helgason, 1999).3
Next, I consider the case when the product characteristics enter the util-
ity function nonlinearly. Then the marginal utility is a product of consumer
type and the slope of the nonlinear function. I show that, because of this sub-
stitution between the nonlinear function and the type, the model cannot be
identified, even for the high-types. I then show that if we have data from ei-
ther two markets or over two periods where the two markets differ in terms
of some exogenous (binary) change in cost, then we can identify the nonlinear
utility and the joint density of high-types as long as the cost affects the marginal
prices. In particular, if the cost is exogenous and independent of the consumer
type then we can compare the multivariate quantiles of choices across these two
cost regimes to identify the multivariate quantile (Koltchinskii, 1997) of the
high-types. The incentive compatibility constraints for the high-type implies
that a median type (among the high-types), say, will choose the median bun-
dle (meant for the high-types) under both costs. Once we have identified the
quantiles for the high-types, we can “control” the type and use the consumers’
3 See Gautier and Kitamura (2013) for an application to random coefficient model.
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(a) Scatter Plot of SMS and Payments (b) Scatter Plot of Voice and Payments
(c) Scatter Plot of SMS and Voice
Figure 1. Scatter Plot of SMS, Voice and Payments
optimality condition to identify the utility function. This method of matching-
quantiles under appropriate exclusion restriction draws insights from Matzkin
(2003) and Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), and as a result is also related
to D’Haultfœuille and Fe´vrier (2011, 2015) and Torgovitsky (2015).4
Even though I do not estimate my model, it might be instructive to consider
a concrete example of a market where my results would be applicable. Consider
the optimal bundling problem faced by a telecommunication company. For
example, consider a dominant telecommunication company in a city in China
that offers multiple cellphone plans with different rates for talk-time, data, and
instant text messaging. For more on this market, see Luo, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2012). A scatter plot of the choices and payments are in Figure 1. As can
4 See the working paper version D’Haultfœuille and Fe´vrier (2011). Also see Aryal, Grundl,
Kim, and Zhu (2015) for an application to auctions with ambiguity.
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be seen, there is substantial heterogeneity among consumers in terms of their
final usage. The payments are not in a ray as a function of either the voice or
the messages. Profit for the seller is highest for the plans that are designed for
high-type consumers, those who have higher willingness to pay and have higher
usage. These high-types, however, cannot be prevented from choosing plans that
are meant for the medium-types or the low-types. So a higher profit can only
be realized if the seller distorts the product characteristics meant for the latter
types in the direction that makes them relatively unattractive for the high-types.
But the optimal amount of distortion, and therefore the welfare estimation,
depends on the joint density of consumer types. To determine the level of
distortion, we have to solve the multidimensional adverse selection (screening)
problem, which means that the observed product characteristics or bundles are
endogenous. With endogenous product characteristics the approach used in
the classic demand estimation, pioneered by Berry (1994); Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995); and more recently by Berry, Gandhi, and Haile (2013), is
inapplicable, not to mention the fact that those models do not allow asymmetric
information.5
Next I explore the questions of over identification and rationalizability of
the models. Over identification affects both the efficiency of an estimator and
the refutability of the model (Koopmans and Riersol, 1950; Romano, 2004). I
show that if the truncated joint density of high-types is over identified when
the utility is nonlinear and we use data on exogenous consumer characteristics.
The logic behind this result is as follows: Since we can identify consumers for
every bundle (meant for the high-types), and since this mapping is independent
of the consumer characteristics, if the data is generated by the Rochet-Chone´
equilibrium then it must be the case that this mapping between type and bundle
maximizes the correlation between the two for all consumer characteristics. In
other words, I ask if there is a way to determine the best way to “transport” the
identified types to the observed bundles. The data is an equilibrium outcome if
and only if such transport maximizes the correlation between the two, where the
correlation is computed with respect to the density of choices and the density
of high-types. Such a problem is known as the optimal transport problem and
has a long history in economics; see Kantorovich (1960). We know from Brenier
(1991) and McCann (1995) that such a mapping exists and is unique, allowing
me to conclude that the model is over-identified. I also study the empirical
5 Fan (2013) considers endogenous product characteristics, but with perfect information.
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content of the Rochet-Chone´ model. To that end, I derive all testable conditions
for a joint distribution of observed choices and prices to be rationalized by the
Rochet-Chone´ model of multidimensional adverse selection. These conditions
can be used in specification tests for model validity, allowing an econometrician
to check if multidimensional adverse selection is important, or a model with
one-dimension sufficiently rich enough to explain the data.
Pioner (2009) studies the semiparametric identification of the Rochet-Chone´
model, but he assumes that: a) there is only two dimensions of private informa-
tion; and b) the econometrician observes one of those types. Between the seller
and the econometrician, it is most likely the seller who knows more. These are
very strong and restrictive assumptions and my results show neither are neces-
sary. The paper also is related to Perrigne and Vuong (2011) and Gayle and
Miller (2014), who study identification of the pure and hybrid moral hazard, re-
spectively; Luo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2012), who study the telecommunication
data; Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) and Aryal (2013), who study competitive
nonlinear pricing; and Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002, 2004); Heck-
man, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2010); Chernozhukov, Galichon, Henry, and Pass
(2014), who study the identification of hedonic models.
The paper is organized as follows. Notations and definitions are in Section
2, Section 3 describes the model, while Section 4 contains the identification
results, and Section 5 provides the rationalizability lemmas. Section 6 considers
measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity before concluding.
2. Notations and Definitions
I will use the notation ζ ∈ Sζ ⊂ Rdζ to indicate a dζ-dimensional vector
with values in the set Sζ , and use ∂Sζ to denote the boundary values for Sζ .
If γ ∈ Sγ ⊂ Rdγ and dγ = dζ = d then ζ · γ :=
∑d
j=1 ζjγj denotes the inner
product. Let κ : Sζ → Rdκ define a dκ dimensional vector of functions
κ(ζ) =

κ1(ζ1, . . . , ζdζ)
...
κdκ(ζ1, . . . , ζdζ)
 .
For a scalar function κ(ζ1, . . . , ζdζ) ∈ R, ∇κj =
(
∂κ
∂ζ1
, . . . , ∂κ
∂ζdζ
)
denotes the
gradient of κ(·), and ∇jκ(·) denotes the jth element of the gradient vector. The
divergence of a scalar function κ(ζ) is defined as divκ =
∑dζ
j=1
∂κ(ζ)
∂ζj
.
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Definition 2.1. A scalar function κ : Rdζ → R is a real analytic function
at ζˇ ∈ Rdζ if there ∃δ > 0 and open ball B(ζˇ , δ) ⊂ Rdζ , 0 ≤ r < δ with∑
k1,...,kJ
|ak1,...,aKJ |rk1+···+kJ <∞ such that
κ(ζˇ) =
∞∑
k1=0
· · ·
∞∑
kJ=0
ak1,...,aKJ (ζˇ1 − ζ1)k1 · · · (ζˇJ − ζJ)kJ , ζ ∈ B(ζˇ , δ).
One of the properties of analytic functions is that if two real analytic convex
functions coincide on an open set, then they coincide on any connected open
subset of Rdζ .
Multivariate Quantiles (Koltchinskii (1997)): Let (S,B, L) be a probability
space with probability measure L. Let g : RJ × S → R be a function such
that g(q, ·) is integrable function L− almost everywhere and g(·, s) is strictly
convex. Let
gL(q) :=
∫
S
g(q, s)L(ds), q ∈ RJ
be an integral transform of L. Let the minimal point of the functional
gL,t(q) := gL(q)− < q, t >, q ∈ RJ
be called an (M, t)− parameter of L with respect to g, where < ·, · > is the
inner product in RJ . The subdifferential of g at a point s ∈ RJ is denoted
by ∂g(s) = {t ∈ RJ |g(s′) ≥ g(s)+ < s′ − s, t >}. Since the kernel g(·, s) is
strictly convex, gL is convex and the subdifferential map ∂gL is well defined.
The inverse of this map ∂g−1L (t) is the quantile function and is the set of all
(M, t)− parameters of L. Since g is strictly convex, ∂g−1L is a single-valued
map, and hence we get a unique quantile.6
One can choose any kernel function g as long as it satisfies the conditions
mentioned above to define a multivariate quantile. Then, from Proposition 2.6
and Corollary 2.9 in Koltchinskii (1997), we know that ∂gL is a strictly monotone
homeomorphism from RJ onto RJ , and for any two probability measures L1
and L2, the equality ∂gL1 = ∂gL2 implies L1 = L2. For this paper, we choose
g(q; s) := |q− s| − |s|, so that gL(q) =
∫
RJ (|q− s| − |s|)L(ds), s ∈ RJ , and
∂gL(q) :=
∫
{s 6=q}
(q− s)
|q− s| L(ds), (1)
with the inverse ∂g−1L (·) as the (unique) quantile function. See Chernozhukov,
Galichon, Hallin, and Henry (2015) for an alternative definition.
6 For example, with one-dimensional case, for any t ∈ (0, 1) the set of all tth quantiles of a
cdf M is exactly the set of all minimal points of gL,t(q) := 1/2
∫
R(|q− s| − |s|+ q)L(ds)− qt.
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3. The Model
In this section I will present the model of multidimensional adverse selection
of Rochet-Chone´. My main goal is to introduce the environment and the condi-
tions that characterize the solution that are essential for identification. I refer
readers to the main paper for any missing detail, including the proofs.
A seller offers a menu of options that includes a product line Q ⊆ Rdq+ , a set
of all feasible characteristics, and a corresponding price function P : Q → R+,
to consumers who have different tastes for the product characteristics. Let
θ ∈ Sθ ⊆ Rdθ+ denote this taste profile (or simply type) that is independently
and identically distributed (across consumers) as Fθ(·). Let X ∈ Sx ⊆ Rdx
denote the consumer’s observed socioeconomic or demographic characteristics.
If a type θ chooses q ∈ Q and pays P (q), let his net utility be given by
V (q; θ,X) := u(q, θ,X)− P (q).
Therefore, we assume the utility function is quasilinear in prices. Let C : Rdq+ →
R+ be the cost function. The objective of the seller is to choose a (convex) set
of product varieties (after suppressing the dependence on X) Q and a price
function P (·) that maximizes her expected profit given the cost function C(·)
and θ ∼ Fθ(·). I begin with the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Let
(i) dθ = dq = J .
(ii) θ
i.i.d∼ Fθ(·) which has a square integrable density f(·) > 0 a.e. on Sθ.
(iii) The net utility be an element of a Sobolev space
V (q; ·, X) ∈ V(Sθ) = {V (q, ·, X)|
∫
Sθ
V 2(θ)dθ <∞,
∫
Sθ
(∇V (q, θ,X))2dθ <∞},
with the norm |V | :=
(∫
Sθ{V 2(θ) + ||∇V (θ)||2}dθ
) 1
2
.
(iv) The gross utility function is multiplicative in θ:
u(q, θ,X) := θ · v(q, X) =
J∑
j=1
θjvj(qj;X),
where each vj(·;X) is differentiable and strictly increasing, and is either:
(iv-a) linear utility: vj(qj, X) = qj.
(iv-b) bilinear utility: dx ≥ J such that X ≡ (X1, X2) ∈ RJ+dx2 with dx2 ≥
0, such that X1 = (X11 , . . . , X1J ) denote those consumer characteristics that
interact multiplicatively with the corresponding product characteristics so that
for j = 1, . . . , J, vj(qj, X) = qj ·X1j .
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(iv-c) nonlinear utility: everything is same as the bilinear case, except that
vj(qj, X) = vj(qj, X2) · X1j , where vj(·, X2) is twice continuously differentiable
and strictly quasi concave function, with full rank Jacobian matrix Dv(q;X2)
for all q ∈ RJ+, vj(0; ·) = 0 and limq→∞ vj(q) =∞.
(v) C(·) is a strongly convex function with parameter ′, i.e. the minimum
eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix is ′.
Assumption 1-(i) assumes that agents differ in as many dimensions as the
attributes of a contract. It means that consumers’ unobserved preference het-
erogeneity is exactly as rich as the dimension of product characteristics. As-
sumption 1-(ii)-(iii) are standard assumptions in the literature in mechanism
design; for more see Rochet-Chone´. Assumption 1-(v) is the standard convex-
ity of cost assumption.
Assumption 1-(iv), however, needs more explanation. The first part of As-
sumption 1-(iv) assumes that the utility function is multiplicatively separable
in consumer type θ and some function of product characteristics. This multi-
plicative separability assumption is an important assumption and is widely used
in mechanism design literature; see Wilson (1993) and Laffont and Martimort
(2001).7 There are typically multiple equilibria, and but it is not unique, but
it to argue that at least one solution exists, but the solution is not unique.
The second part of the assumption puts more structure on the way the product
characteristics enter the utility function (from linear to nonlinear). Assumption
1-(iv-a) assumes that the product characteristics enters linearly and does not
depend on consumer characteristics X. Assumption 1-(iv-b) assumes that some
consumer characteristics might interact with the product characteristics. In
particular, it assumes that there are at least as many consumer characteristics
as product characteristics, i.e., dx ≥ J , such that we can divide the vector X
into two parts: X1, a J−dimensional vector, and X2, a dx− J dimensional vec-
tor, depending on whether or not they interact with the product characteristics.
The gross utility from a product characteristic qj is then simply θ · qj ·X1j . So,
under this specification the product characteristics still enter linearly and are
independent of X2. Assumption 1-(iv-c) generalizes the previous assumption
and allows product characteristics to enter the utility function nonlinearly and
allows this function to also depend on X2 as long as it is bilinear in θ and X1j .
It is important to note that for the theoretical model it suffices that the
utility function u(θ,q;X) be multiplicatively separable in θ because we can
7 Some exceptions include Carlier (2001) and Figalli, Kim, and McCann (2011).
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redefine the units of measurement for the product characteristics and substitute
q˜ := v(q, X) in the place of q because the seller observes X and knows v(·, ·).
Therefore, the only purpose of these three assumptions is from the point of view
of an empirical application. Since there is no intrinsic unit of measurement when
it comes to the product characteristics, I consider three different cases and study
the identification problem for each of them. So, even though assumption 1-(iv-c)
allow for the most general functional form, studying the identification of linear
and bilinear utility will allow me to isolate the data feature that identifies the
model parameter.
For notational ease I will suppress the dependence on X until next section.
A menu {Q,P} is feasible if there exists an allocation rule ρ : Sθ → Q that
satisfies incentive compatibility (IC) condition,
∀θ ∈ Sθ, V (ρ(θ), θ) = max
q˜∈Q
{θ · v(q˜)− P (q˜)} ≡ U(θ), (2)
and individual rationality (IR) condition, U(θ) ≥ U0 := θ · v(q0) − P0. {q0}
denotes the outside option available to everyone at a fixed price P0. To ensure
the principal’s optimization problem is convex, we assume that P0 ≥ C(q0), so
that the seller will always offer q0, i.e., Q 3 q0. The seller chooses a feasible
menu (Q, ρ(·), P (q)), that maximizes expected profit
EΠ =
∫
Sθ
pi(θ)dF (θ) :=
∫
Sθ
1{U(θ) ≥ U0}(P (q(θ))− C(q(θ)))dF (θ), (3)
where 1{·} is an indicator function. Let S(ρ(θ), θ) be the social surplus when
θ type is allocated q(θ) so that
S(ρ(θ), θ) = U(θ) + pi(θ),
or, equivalently,
S(ρ(θ), θ) = {θ · v(ρ(θ))− P (ρ(θ))}+ {P (ρ(θ))− C(ρ(θ))}.
Equating these two definitions allows us to express type-specific profit as
pi(θ) = θ · v(ρ(θ))− C(ρ(θ))− U(θ).
Rochet (1987) showed that under Assumption 1, a menu {Q, ρ(·), P (·)} is such
that U(θ) solves Equation (2) (satisfies IC) if and only if (i) ρ(θ) = v−1(∇U(θ))
and (ii) U(·) is convex on Θ. This means that choosing an optimal contract
{Q, ρ(·), P (·)} is equivalent to determining the net utility (or the information
rent) U(θ) that each θ gets by participating. U(θ) also determines a the corre-
sponding optimal allocation rule as ρ(θ) = v−1(∇U(θ)).
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Using this result, we can pose the seller’s problem as choosing U(θ) ∈ H1(Sθ)
that maximizes the expected profit
EΠ(U) =
∫
Sθ
{θ · ∇U(θ)− U(θ)− C(v−1(∇U(θ)))}dF (θ),
subject to the IC and the IR constraints. As mentioned above, the global IC
constraint is equivalent to convexity of U(·), i.e., D2U(θ) ≥ 0, and IR is equiv-
alent to U(θ) ≥ U0(θ) for all θ ∈ Sθ. Rochet-Chone´ showed that Assumption
1 is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique maximizer U∗(·). In what
follows we will characterize some key properties of the solution.
When there is only one-dimensional asymmetric information (J = 1), we can
ignore the inequality constraints to find an unconstrained maximizer and verify
ex post that these inequality constraints are satisfied. The assumption that the
type distribution is regular (the inverse hazard rate [1 − F (·)]/[f(·)] is strictly
decreasing) was sufficient to guarantee that the constraints were satisfied and
equilibrium always had perfect screening. When J > 1, however, Rochet-Chone´
showed that this approach of ex post verification does not work and bunching
can never be ruled out. In an important paper, Armstrong (1996) proposes
various assumptions that are sufficient to ensure perfect screening. Rochet-
Chone´ has shown that those assumptions are very restrictive and are seldom
satisfied. Moreover, it is my opinion that imposing such restrictions to simplify
the problem would have been at odds with the nonparametric identification
objective of this paper.
One of the key results of Rochet-Chone´ is that with multidimensional type,
the seller will always find it profitable not to perfectly screen consumers and
hence bunching (for some subsets of types) was inevitable. And since under
bunching two distinct types of consumers choose the same option, it makes
identification all that more difficult. In equilibrium the consumers will be di-
vided into three types: the lowest-types S0θ who are screened out and offered
only {q0}, the medium-types S1θ who are bunched and offered “medium type”
bundles and the high-types S2θ who are perfectly screened. The next step is to
determine these subsets, which will depend on the model parameters.
If an indirect utility function U∗(·) is optimal then offering any other feasible
function (U∗ + h)(·), where h is non-negative and convex, must lower expected
profit for the seller, i.e., EΠ(U∗) ≥ EΠ(U∗ + h). This inequality means the
directional derivative of the expected profit, in the direction of h, must be
nonnegative so U∗(·) is the solution iff: (a) U∗(·) is a convex function and for all
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convex, non-negative function h, EΠ′(U∗)h ≥ 0; and (b) EΠ′(U∗)(U∗−U0) = 0
with (U∗ − U0) ≥ 0. The Euler-Lagrange condition for the (unconstrained)
problem is
∂pi
∂U∗
−
J∑
j=1
∂
∂θj
[
∂pi
∂(∇jU∗)
]
= 0,
or, α(θ) := −[f(θ) + div {f(θ)(θ −∇C(∇U∗))}] = 0. (4)
Intuitively, α(θ) measures the marginal loss of the seller when the indirect utility
(information rent) of type θ is increased marginally from U∗ to U∗ + h. Alter-
natively, define ν(θ) := ∂S(θ,q(θ))
∂q
, the marginal distortion vector, then α(θ) = 0
is equivalent to div(ν(θ)) = −f(θ), which is the optimal tradeoff between dis-
tortion and information rent. Let L(h) = −EΠ′(U∗)h be the loss of the seller
at U∗ for the variation h. So if the seller increases U∗ in the direction of some
h, then the seller’s marginal loss can be expressed as
L(h) =
∫
Sθ
h(θ)α(θ)dθ +
∫
∂Sθ
h(θ) (−ν(θ) · nˆ(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=β(θ)
dσ(θ) :=
∫
Sθ
h(θ)dµ(θ), (5)
where dσ(θ) is the Lebesgue measure on the boundary ∂Sθ, nˆ(θ) is an outward
normal, and dµ(θ) := α(θ)dθ+β(θ)dσ(θ). If we consider those who participate,
i.e., U∗(θ) ≥ U0(θ), this marginal loss L(h) must be zero. Since h ≥ 0 it means
µ(θ) = 0, so that both α(θ) and β(θ) := −ν(θ) · nˆ(θ) must be equal to zero. For
those who do not participate, it must mean the loss is positive.
Lemma 1. Rochet-Chone´ Proposition 4: The optimal U∗ satsifies
∀θ ∈ Sθ, α(θ)
{
> 0, U∗(θ) ≤ U0(θ)
= 0, U∗(θ) > U0(θ)
, (6)
and ∀θ ∈ ∂Sθ, β(θ)
{
> 0, U∗(θ) ≤ U0(θ)
= 0, U∗(θ) > U0(θ)
. (7)
The global incentive compatibility condition is important because it determines
the optimal bunching in the equilibrium by requiring (U∗−U0)(θ) be convex, and
also determines the subset S1θ where the optimal allocation rule ρ(·) will be such
that some types are allotted the same quantity q. Let S1θ (q) be the types that
gets the same q, i.e., S1θ (q) = {θ ∈ Θ : ρ(θ) = q} = {θ ∈ Θ : U∗(θ) = θ·q−P (q)}.
If U∗(θ) is convex for all θ, i.e., if the global incentive compatibility constraint is
satisfied, then there is no bunching and S1θ would be an empty set. In most of the
cases, however, the convexity condition fails and hence there will be non-trivial
bunching. So, U∗ is affine on all the bunches, and the incentive compatibility
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constraint is binding for any two types θ′, θ if and only if they both belong to
S1θ (q), i.e. if θ′ 6∈ S1θ (q) but θ ∈ S1θ (q) then U∗(θ′) > U∗(θ) + (θ − θ′)Tq.
Theorem 3.1. Rochet-Chone´ Theorem 2’: Under Assumptions 1-(i)–(iv-a) and
(v) the optimal solution U∗ to the problem is characterized by three subsets
S0θ ,S1θ , and S2θ such that:
(1) A positive mass of types S0θ do not participate because U∗(θ) = U0(θ).
This set is characterized by µ(S0θ ) = 1, i.e.,
∫
S0θ
α(θ)dθ+
∫
∂S0θ
β(θ)dθ = 1.
(2) S1θ is a set of “medium types” known as the bunching region, which is
further subdivided into subset S1θ (q) such that all types in this subset get
one type q, U∗ is affine. µ restricted to S1θ (q) satisfies:
∫
S1θ (q)
dµ(θ) = 0
and
∫
S1θ (q)
θdµ(θ) = 0.
(3) S2θ is the perfect screening region where U∗ satisfies the Euler condition
α(θ) = 0, or equivalently div(ν(θ)) = −f(θ), for all θ ∈ S1θ ∩ Sθ, and
there is no distortion in the optimal allocation on the boundary, i.e.
β(θ) = 0 on S1θ ∩ ∂Sθ.
In summary, the type space is (endogenously) divided into three parts: those
who are excluded S0θ and get the outside option q0; those who are bunched S1θ
and are allocated some intermediate quality q ∈ Q1 such that all θ ∈ S1θ (q) get
the same quantity q; and, finally, those who are perfectly screened S2θ and are
allocated some unique (customized) q ∈ Q2. An example is shown in Fig. 2. It
is also important to note that the allocation rule ρ(·) is continuous.
Corollary 1. ρ(·) is continuous and ∂ρ(θj ,θ−j)
∂θj
> 0,∀(θj, θ−j) ∈ Θ2.
Proof. For θ ∈ Θ2, since D2U∗(θ) > 0 and because ρ(θ) = ∇U∗(θ) it is also
continuous. Likewise, for all θ ∈ Θ0, ρ(θ) = q0 and hence continuous. Similar
arguments show that ρ(θ) is continuous for all θ ∈ S1θ . 
4. Identification
In this section we study the identification of the distribution of types Fθ(·) and
the cost function C(·) from the observables that include the triplet {qi, pi, Xi}
for every consumer. Let (q, p,X)
i.i.d∼ Ψp,q,X(·, ·, ·, ·) = Ψp,q|X(·, ·|·) × ψX(·).
The seller offers (Q(x), P(x)(·)) to agent i with observed characteristics Xi =
x ∼ ΨX(·) and unobserved type θi ∼ Fθ(·), who then chooses qi ∈ Q(x) and
pays pi = P(x)(qi) that maximizes the net utility. The seller chooses the menu
optimally, which from the revelation principle is equivalent to saying that there
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exists a direct mechanism, a unique pair of (allocation rule) ρ(·) : Sθ 7→ Q(x,z),
and (pricing function) Px(·) : Q(x) 7→ R+, such that qi = ρ(θi) and pi =
Px(ρ(θi)). Henceforth, ρ(·) will stand for the optimal allocation rule.
Thus assuming that: a) consumers have private information about θ; b) the
seller only knows the Fθ(·) and C(·), and designs a {Q,P (·)} to maximize profit;
and c) consumers optimize, leads to the following model:
pi = P [qi, Fθ(·), C(·);X]
qi = ρ[θi, Fθ(·), C(·);X], i ∈ [N ], k = 1, 2. (8)
The model parameters [Fθ(·), C(·)] are said to be identified if for any differ-
ent parameters [F˜θ(·), C˜(·)] the implied data distributions are also different,
i.e., Ψp,q,X(·, ·, ·) 6= Ψ˜p,q,X(·, ·, ·). Since the equilibrium is unique, there is
a unique distribution of the observable Ψp,q,X(·, ·, ·) for every parameter (Jo-
vanovic, 1989). My objective is to determine some low-level conditions under
which the model is globally identified, which is tantamount to showing that
Equations in (8) are globally invertible.8
Following the equilibrium characterization, I consider the three subsets of
types separately. For every X = x let Qj(x) be the set of choices made by
consumers with type θ ∈ Sjθ for j = 0, 1, 2, respectively. Since q(·) is continuous
(Corollary 1), these sets are well defined. In what follows, I will use data from
Qk(x) to identify the model parameters restricted to Sjθ , beginning with the subset
Q2(x). The allocation rule ρ(·) is one-to-one when restricted to S2θ , and hence its
inverse ρ−1(·) exists on Q2(x), but not when restricted to S1θ because of bunching,
and, as a consequence, the identification strategies are different.9
In what follows, I suppress the dependence on X until it is relevant. Let
M(·) and m(·) be the distribution and density of q, respectively. Since the
equilibrium indirect utility function U∗ is unique, it implies that there is a
unique distribution M(·) that corresponds to the model structure [Fθ(·), C(·)].
Thus the structure is said to be identified if for given m(·) there exists a (unique)
pair [Fθ(·), C(·)] that satisfies Equations (8). Let θ˜(·) : Q −→ S2θ be the inverse
of ρ(·) when restricted on Q2, i.e., ∀q ∈ Q2, θ˜(q) = ρ−1(q). Similarly, let
M∗(q) and m∗(q) be the truncated distribution and density of q ∈ Q2(x) defined,
8 See Rothenberg (1971) and Chen, Chernozhukov, Lee, and Newey (2014) for local iden-
tification in parametric and (semi)nonparametric setups, respectively.
9 Since U∗(θ) is convex on S2θ , the inverse ρ−1(·) that solves q = ρ(θ) exists (Kachurovksii,
1960). Also see Parthasarathy (1983) and Fujimoto and Herrero (2000) for more details.
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respectively, as:
M∗(q) := Pr(q˜ < q|q ∈ Q2) = Pr(θ < θ˜(q)|θ ∈ S2θ ) =
∫
S2θ
1{θ < θ˜(q)}fθ(θ|θ ∈ S2θ )dθ;
m∗(q) :=
m(q)∫
Q2
m(q˜)dq˜
=
f(θ˜(q))∫
Q2
f(θ˜(q˜))dq˜
|det(Dθ˜)(q)|, (9)
where det(·) is the determinant function. Then the bijection between high-type
and high-qualities gives
M∗(q) = Pr(ρ(θ, Fθ, C) ≤ q|q ∈ Q2) = Fθ ◦ ρ−1(q|q ∈ Q2), (10)
which will be a key relationship for identification. Before moving on, I introduce
new short-hand notations. Let Fθ(·|j) be the CDF Fθ(·) restricted to be in the
set Sjθ and let Nj be the set of consumers who buy q ∈ Qj, for j = 0, 1, 2.
4.1. Linear Utility. I begin by showing that without any further restrictions
Fθ(·|2) can be identified and C(·) can be identified on Q2. When the util-
ity function is linear, consumer optimality for the high-types implies that the
marginal utility, which is θ, is equal to the marginal prices ∇P (·) – the gra-
dient of price function. Therefore the type that chooses q ∈ Q2 must satisfy
∇P (q) = θ = θ˜(q), which identifies the (pseudo) type θi = θ˜(qi) for all i ∈ [N2].
This identification argument uses the demand-side optimality and the price gra-
dients. We lose this identification when either the utility function is nonlinear
(Subsection 4.3) or when there are discrete options and we cannot calculate the
price gradients (Subsection 6.4).
As θ˜(·) restricted to S2θ is bijective we can identify the truncated joint distri-
bution of types, or simply the joint distribution of high-types as
Fθ(ξ|2) = Pr(q ≤ (∇P )−1(ξ)|Q ∈ Q2) = M∗((∇P )−1(ξ)).
Next, I consider identification of the cost function. The equilibrium allocation
condition (4) is α(θ) = 0, or
div {fθ(θ)(θ −∇C(∇U∗))} = −fθ(θ).
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If we divide both sides by
∫
S2θ
fθ(t)dt we get
div
{
fθ(θ)∫
S2θ
fθ(t)dt
(θ −∇C(∇U∗))
}
= − fθ(θ)∫
S2θ
fθ(t)dt
div
{
m∗(q)
|det(Dθ˜)(q)|(θ˜(q)−∇C(q))
}
= − m
∗(q)
|det(Dθ˜)(q)|
div
{
m∗(q)
|det(D∇P (q))|(∇P (q)−∇C(q))
}
= − m
∗(q)
|det(D∇P (q))| ,
where the second equality follows from Equation (9) and the last equality fol-
lows from the definition of the curvature of the pricing function, i.e., D∇P (q) =
Dθ˜(q). This means the cost function C(·) is the solution to the partial differen-
tial equation (PDE) with the following boundary condition, β(θ) = 0 on ∂Q2,
i.e.,
m∗(q)
|det(D∇P (q))|(∇C(q)−∇P (q)) ·
−→n (∇P (q)) = 0.
The cost function C(·) is on the convex set Q2 identified as the unique solution
of this PDE (Evans, 2010). To extend it to the entire domain we need:
Assumption 2. Cost function C : Q→ R is a real analytic function at q ∈ Q.
This assumption about C(·) being analytic is a technical assumption that as-
sumes C(·) is infinitely differentiable and can be expressed (uniquely) as a Taylor
series. Hence, it allows for any convex polynomial, trigonometric, and exponen-
tial functions. Once the cost function is identified on an open convex set Q2, the
analytic extension theorem implies that the function has a unique extension to
the entire domain Q. Since the cost function is completely unspecified, besides
convexity, we need to restrict the space of functions to be able to extend it
everywhere. Assuming that the cost function is analytic is sufficient. Undoubt-
edly this is stronger than anything I have assumed thus far, but this assumption
has also been used in the literature on nonparametric identification. Newey and
Powell (2003) assume that the density belongs to the exponential family, which
is analytic (see Liese and Miescke, 2008, Lemma 1.16) and therefore has a unique
extension; Fox, il Kim, Ryan, and Bajari (2012) also assume real analyticity to
identify a random coefficient logit model; and Fox and Gandhi (2013) assume
the utility function is real analytic to identify a random utility model. This
result is formalized below.
Theorem 4.1. Under the Assumptions 1-(i)–(iv-a), (v), and 2, the model struc-
ture [Fθ(·|2), C(·)] is nonparametrically identified.
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Figure 2. Optimal Product Line from Rochet-Chone´.
It is clear that the monotonicity of ρ(·) is the key to identification, and since we
lose monotonicity on S1θ we lose identification, as shown in the example below
which is taken from Rochet-Chone´.
Example 4.1. Let J = 2 and the cost function be C(q) = c/2(q21 + q
2
2) and
types are independent and uniformly distributed on Sθ = [0, 1]2 and q0 = 0
and P0 = 0. Then, the optimal indirect utility function U
∗ has different shapes
in the three regions: (i) in the non-participation region S0θ , U∗(θ) = 0; (ii) in
the bunching region S1θ , U∗ depends only on θ1 + θ2; and (iii) in the perfect
screening region S2θ , U∗ is strictly convex.
On S0θ , ρ(θ) = 0, which means α(θ) = div(θf(θ)) + f(θ) = 3 and β(θ) = a
on ∂S0θ . The boundary that separates S0θ and S1θ is a linear line τ0 = θ1 + θ2,
where τ0 =
√
6
3
. On S1θ , ρ(θ) = (ρ1(θ), ρ2(θ)) = (ρb(τ), ρb(τ)), with θ1 + θ2 = τ .
In other words, all consumers with type θ1 + θ2 = τ are treated the same
and they get the same ρ1(τ) = ρ2(τ) = ρb(τ). So α(θ) = 3 − 2cq′b(τ) and on
∂S1θ , β(θ) = (cρ(θ) − θ) · nˆ(θ) = −cρb(τ). Sweeping conditions are satisfied if
α(θ) ≥ 0 and β(θ) ≥ 0 and on each bunch∫ τ
0
α(θ1, τ − θ1)dθ1 + β(0, τ) + β(τ, 0) = 0,
which can be used to solve for qb as ρb(τ) =
3τ
4c
− 1
2cτ
. Then S1θ = {θ : τ0 ≤
θ1 + θ2 ≤ τ1} where τ1 is determined by the continuity condition on Sθ of ρ(·),
i.e. ρb(τ1) = 0. Now, define τ = ρ
−1
b (q) as the inverse of the optimal (bunching)
mechanism. Then, identification is to determine the joint cdf of (θ1, θ2) from
that of τ = θ1 + θ2, which is not possible.
To summarize: the seller divides the consumers into three categories and per-
fectly screens only the top ones. We can then use the distribution of choices
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made by consumers to determine their types and the cost function. To under-
stand the welfare consequences of asymmetric information, we might also want
to understand the heterogeneity in preference of those in the medium categories
that are not perfectly screened but are not excluded from the market either.
The example above shows that if we restrict the utility function to be linear
and independent of the consumer characteristics, then because the bunching is
also linear, we cannot identify the types.
4.1.1. Note. This is also a right time to pause and explore the consequence of
using only the consumer side optimality condition for identification and ignor-
ing the supply side. To understand the argument it is sufficient to consider
discrete types, while keeping aside the problem of identifying the cost func-
tion. To that end, let J = 2 and Sθ = {{θ1,1, θ1,2}, {θ2,1, θ2,2}, {θ3,1, θ3,2}}
with probability {f1, f2, f3}, respectively. Suppose the optimal allocation is
such that θ1 is allocated a bundle q1 = (q1,1, q1,2) but the remaining two
types are bunched at q2 = (q2,1, q2,2), and P (·, ·) is the pricing function and
∇jP (·, ·) be the partial derivative with respect to the jth argument.10 Sup-
pose the data consists of choice-prices pairs {qi, Pi : i = 1, . . . , N}, and let
m1 and m2 be the fraction of consumers who choose q1 and q2, respectively.
If we ignore the supply side and only use the demand side, then we will use
θi = (θj,1, θj,2) = (∇1P (qj,1, qj,2),∇2P (qj,1, qj,2)) whenever qi = (qj,1, qj,2), j ∈
{1, 2}. We will then conclude that there are only two types of consumer given
by (∇1P (qj,1, qj,2),∇2P (qj,1, qj,2)), j = 1, 2 with probability (m1 = f1,m2 =
f2 + f3), which is not the right parameter.
A natural next step would then be to explore the variation in X ′s to identify
the model. In particular, I ask: If the utility is also a function of observed char-
acteristics X, then can we use the variation in those observed characteristics to
identify the medium-types, the types that are bunched? In the following sub-
section I show that the answer is positive. Under the Assumption 1-(iv-b) that
the utility is bilinear, if the observed characteristics X are (statistically) inde-
pendent of the type θ, and if the dimension of X is the same as the dimension
of θ, then we can identify fθ(·|1).
10 I am abusing the notation and using partial derivatives to mean inite differences.
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4.2. Bilinear Utility. In this subsection I assume that the base utility function
satisfies Assumption 1-(iv-b) and X1 is independent of θ. Recall from assump-
tion 1-(iv) that X1 denotes those characteristics that interact with product
characteristics, while X2 do not.
Assumption 3. Characteristics X = (X1, X2) and θ are mutually independent.
In particular, suppose that the net utility of choosing q by an agent with char-
acteristics X and unobserved θ is
V (q; θ,X) =
J∑
j=1
θjX1jqj − P (q). (11)
Now, X1 affects the utility, and hence it will also affect the product line and
price functions because now they will depend on X. However, once we fix
the value of X1 = x1 (which is observed by the seller) and change the unit of
measurement of product quality from q to q˜ := x1 · q, we can apply Theorem
4.1 to identify f(θ|2). Next, I show that we can also use exogenous variation in
X1 to identify the density f(θ|1) over the bunching region S1θ . So, independent
variation in X1 is an important assumption for identification. As will be clear,
we will use the notation fθ(·|1) to make it clear that it is the density of θ ∈ S1θ .
In the example above we saw that all agents with type such that τ =
∑
j∈[J ] θ
selected the same q(τ). Now that the agents vary in X, agents are bunched
according to W =
∑
j∈J θjX1j, in other words, all agents with the same W self
select ρ(W ), i.e. ρ(θ) = (ρ1(θ), . . . , ρJ(θ)) = (ρ1(W ), . . . , ρJ(W )) for all θ ∈ S1θ .
In other words, W acts as a sufficient statistic, and incentive compatibility
requires that q(W ) be monotonic in W and hence invertible. So from the
observed q we can determine the index W := ρ−1(q). Then, the identification
problem is to recover fθ(·) from the the joint density fW,X1(·, ·) of (W,X1) when
W = θ1X11 + · · ·+ θJX1J .
Normalize the above equation by multiplying both sides by ||X1||−1, which gives
B = θ1D1 + · · ·+ θJDJ = θ ·D,
where D = ||X1||−1X1 is an element of a J− dimensional unit sphere SJ−1 :=
{ω ∈ RJ : ||ω|| = 1}, and B = ||X1||−1W ∈ R.
Then the conditional density of B given D = d is
fB|D(b|d) =
∫
S1θ
fB|D,θ(b|d, θ)fθ(θ|1)dθ =
∫
{b=θ·d}
fθ(θ|1)dσ(θ) := Rfθ(b, d).
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Rfθ(b, d) is called the Radon transform (Bracewell, 1990; Helgason, 1999) of
fθ(·|1). Since the conditional density fB|D(·|·) is identified from fB,D(·, ·), iden-
tification of fθ(·|1) is equivalent to showing that Rfθ(·, ·) is invertible, for which
we need sufficient variation in X ′1s. For illustration, consider an extreme case
where X1 is a vector of constants (a1, . . . , aJ) ∈ SJ−1, then we cannot identify
fθ(·|1) from B = a1θ1 + · · ·+ aJθJ .
Let Chh(·) denote the Fourier transform of a function h, so
ChRf (ξ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−2piibξRf(d, b)db; Chf (ξd) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−2pii(θ·ξd)fθ(θ|1)dθ,
are the Fourier transforms of Rf(d, b) and fθ(·|1) evaluated at ξ and ξd, for a
fixed d, respectively. ChRf (ξ) is known from fB,D(·, ·), but Chf (·) is unknown.
For identification I use the following property of the Fourier transform of a Ran-
don transform. For a function of two variables h(y1, y2), its Fourier transform
is Chh(t1, t2) =
∫∫
h(y1, y2)e
−2pii(t1y1+t2y2)dy1dy2, so if we take its projection of
h(·, ·) on to the y1− axis p˜(x) =
∫
h(y1, y2)dy2 then we have
Chh(t1, 0) =
∫∫
h(y1, y2)e
−2piit1y2dy1dy2 =
∫ ∞
−∞
p˜(y1)e
−2piit1y1dy1 = Chp˜(t1).
For ease of explication, if one slightly abuses the notations and abstracts away
from the differences where the functions should be evaluated, one can see that
Chh(t1, 0) is ChRf (t1) and Chp˜(t1) is Chf (t1), which means (the unknown)
Chf (·) is equal to (the known) ChRf (·), thereby identifying fθ(·|1) as the Fourier
inverse of Chf (·). The Projection Slice Theorem (Bracewell, 1956) formalizes
this intuition and guarantees that for a fixed d, Chf (ξd) = ChRf (ξ), and hence,
fθ(θ|1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e2piiθ·ξChRf (ξ)dξ.
Theorem 4.2. Under Assumptions 1-(i)–(iv-b), (v), and 2 and 3 the densities
fθ(·|1), fθ(·|2) and the cost function C(·) are nonparametrically identified.
Intuitively, the identification exploits the fact that two consumers with same
θ but different X1 will face different menus and different choices. So if we
consider the population with fixed X1, the variation in the choices must be
due to the variation in θ. But as we change X1 from x1 to x
′
1, the choices
change but variation in θ remains the same, because X1 |= θ. So with continuous
variation in X1, we have infinitely many moment conditions for θ, which allows
us to express the conditional choice density given X1 as a (mixture) Radon
transform of the fθ(·|1) with mixing density being the marginal density of X1.
Hence, even when the equilibrium fails to be bijective, we might be able to
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use variation in consumer socioeconomic and demographic characteristics X1
for identification. Since the joint density of types in S2θ (who were perfectly
screened) was identified even without X1, this result suggests that the model is
over identified, which can then be used for specification testing. Even though
this intuition is correct, we will postpone the discussion of over identification
until the next subsection, when I consider nonlinear utility function. I will show
that when utility is nonlinear, and if we have access to a discrete (binary) cost
shifter, then to identify the model it is sufficient that the cost shifter causes the
gradient of pricing functions to intersect.
Note: So far I have implicitly assumed that we can divide the observed choices
{qi} into three subsets. We know the outside option Q0 = {q0}, so the only
thing left is to determine the bunching set Q1. As seen in Figure 2, the product
line Q1 is congruent to one-dimensional R+, which is the main characteristic of
bunching. In a higher dimension, the set Q1 will consist of all products that are
congruent with the positive real of dimension lower than J .
4.3. Nonlinear Utility. In this section I consider the model with nonlinear
utility (Assumption 1-(iv-c)), i.e., the (gross) utility function is equal to X1 ·
v(q;X2). To keep the arguments clear, I will ignore X, which is tantamount
to assuming that dx = 0, and focus on the identification of v(q) on S2θ . Once
we have understood what variation in the data drives identification, we can
introduce X and consider the possibility of over-identification.
I begin by first showing that the model [Fθ(·|2), C(·),v(·)] cannot be identified
because the two optimality conditions Equations (2) and (10) are insufficient.
Identification fails because of the substitutability between the type θ and the
curvature of the utility function v(·), as shown below.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-(i)–(iv-c) and (v) the model {Fθ(·|2), C(·),v(·)},
where the domain of the cost and utility functions are restricted to be Q2 and
S2θ , respectively, are not identified.
Proof. Since the optimality condition (4) is used to determine the cost function,
we can treat the cost function as known. I will suppress the dependence on X2
and let J = 2, so V (q; θ) = θ1v1(q1) + θ2v2(q2) − P (q1, q2). Let the utility
function be vj(qj) = q
ωj
j , ωj ∈ (0, 1), and the distribution be Fθ(·, ·|2) and
density be fθ(·|2). Observed {qj, pj} solve the first-order condition
θjωjq
ωj−1
j =
∂P (q1, q2)
∂qj
= pj, j = 1, 2.
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Using the change of variable, the joint (truncated) density of (q1, qj) is
m∗q(q1, q2) = fθ
(
P1
ω1q
ω1−1
1
,
P2
ω2q
ω2−1
2
|2
)
P1P2(1− ω1)(1− ω2)
ω1ω2q
ω1
1 q
ω2
2
.
Let θˇj ≡ θj × ωj ∼ Fθˇ(·|2), where Fθˇ(·|2) = Fθ(·/ω|2) with ω ≡ (ω1, ω2) and
vˇ(qj) = v(qj)/ω = q
ωj
j /ωj, be a new model. It is easy to check that {qj, pj}
solves the first-order condition implied by [vˇ(·), Fθˇ(·)], and the joint (truncated)
density of (q1, q2) is
mˇ∗q(q1, q2) = fθˇ
(
p1
qω1−11
,
p2
qω2−12
∣∣∣2) p1p2(1− ω1)(1− ω2)
qω11 q
ω2
2
= fθ
(
p1
ω1q
ω1−1
1
,
p2
ω2q
ω2−1
2
∣∣∣2) p1p2(1− ω1)(1− ω2)
ω1ω2q
ω1
1 q
ω2
2
= m∗q(q1, q2).

As we have seen here, we can increase the type to θ · ω and decrease the cur-
vature of utility to v(q)/ω without changing the observable choices. Therefore,
data from only one market is not enough for identification. To that end, let
Z ∈ SZ = {z1, z2} be an exogenous and binary cost shifter that only affects the
cost function C(·;Z) and is independent of the consumer type and the utility
function Z |= (θ,v(·)). For such a shifter to have identification power it must not
only change cost but also change the relative prices; however, it is not necessary
for us to observe Z. Such a cost shifter could be either in the form of some
exogenous change in law that affects prices over two periods, or different tax or
marketing expenses across two independent markets. Either way, as I will show
later, it is sufficient for Z to be binary. This exclusion restriction implies that
at different values of the cost shifter: a) the ratio of the types will be equal to
the ratio of the slope of the prices at different values of the cost shifter; and b)
the (multivariate) quantiles of choices by the high-types are the same.
To see how Z can help in the identification, consider the non-identification
example in Lemma 2. I will use the subscript ` ∈ {1, 2} in {P`(·), ρ`(·)} to
denote the price function and allocation rule when Z = z`. As in Lemma 2, the
utility function is v(q1, q2) =
(
v1(q1)
v2(q2)
)
=
(
(q1)
ω1
(q2)
ω2
)
. As before, let us focus
only on the high-types S2θ and further assume that Q2 is also invariant to Z.
Then the demand-side optimality (marginal utility equals the marginal price)
can be written as(
∇1P`(q)
∇2P`(q)
)
=
(
θ˜`1(q) · v′1(q1)
θ˜`2(q) · v′2(q2)
)
=
(
θ˜`1(q) · ω1(q1)ω1−1
θ˜`2(q) · ω2(q2)ω2−1
)
, ` = 1, 2.
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Solving for ∇v(qj) for ` = 1, 2 and equating the two gives(
θ˜11(q)/θ˜21(q)
θ˜21(q)/θ˜22(q)
)
=
(
∇1P1(q)/∇1P2(q)
∇2P1(q)/∇2P2(q)
)
,
i.e., the ratio of types should equal the ratio of marginal prices, or equivalently(
θ˜11(q)
θ˜21(q)
)
=
(
∇1P1(q)/∇1P2(q) · θ˜21(q)
∇2P1(q)/∇2P2(q) · θ˜22(q)
)
. (12)
Equation (12) captures the fact that a consumer who pays higher marginal price
for a q when Z = z1 than when Z = z2 must have higher type θ˜1(q) than θ˜2(q).
So, if we know θ′s choice q = q1(θ) when Z = z1 then we can use the curvature
of the pricing functions to determine θ that chooses the same q when Z = z2.
Now, consider the supply side. The allocation rule for the high-types is
monotonic (IC constraint), so we know:
Fθ(t|2) = Fθ(t1, t2|2) = Pr(θ1 ≤ t1, θ2 ≤ t2|S2θ ) = Pr(ρ(θ, z`) ≤ ρ(t, z`)|Q2)
= Pr(q ≤ ρ(t, z`)) = Pr(q1 ≤ ρ1(t, z`), q2 ≤ ρ2(t, z`)|Q2)
= M∗` (ρ`(t)), ` = 1, 2,
where the third equality follows from the monotonicity of ρ(·, Z) and exogeneity
of Z. This relationship is independent of Z, which gives the following equality
M∗1 (ρ1(t)) = M
∗
2 (ρ2(t)).
Hence, the (multivariate) quantiles of the choice distribution when Z = z1 are
equal to those when Z = z2
ρ1(t) = (M
∗
1 )
−1[M∗2 (ρ2(t))], (13)
and since (M∗1 )
−1 ◦M∗2 (·) is identified, we can identify ρ1(θ) if we know ρ2(θ).
Therefore, the difference, ((M∗1 )
−1 ◦M∗2 (ρ(τ))−ρ(τ)), measures the change in q
when Z moves from z2 to z1, while fixing the quantile of q at τ . This variation
(13) together with (12) can be used to first identify θ˜(·) and then ∇v(q) as a
(vector valued) function that solves ∇P (q) = θ˜(q) ◦ ∇v(q).
The intuition behind identification is as follows: Start with a normalization
θ0 ≡ θ˜2(q0) for some bundle q0 = (q01, q02) ∈ Q2, and determine∇P1(q0),∇P2(q0),
the quantile τ = M∗2 (q
0), and θ1 ≡ θ˜1(q0) from (12).11 Using (13), determine
q1 with the same quantile τ under Z = z1. Then, for q
1 determine ∇P1(q1)
and ∇P2(q1), which can determine θ2 = θ˜2(q1) = ∇P2(q1) ◦ (∇P1(q1))−1 ◦ θ1
11 Here, the superscript is an index of the sequence of bundles, and should not be confused
with the utility function vj(qj) = (qj)
ωj ; similarly for the superscript on θ.
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(inverse of (12)). Then, iterating these steps, we can identify a sequence
{θ0, θ1, . . . , θL, . . .} and the corresponding quantile. If these sequences form
a dense subset of Q2 then the function θ˜(·) : Q2 × SZ → S2θ is identified every-
where. I formalize this intuition for J ≥ 2 below, starting with the assumption
about exclusion restriction.
Assumption 4. Let Z ∈ SZ = {z1, z2} be independent of θ and v(q).
As before, consumer optimality implies∇P`(q) = θ˜`(q)◦∇v(q), and the general
version of Equation (12) can be written as
θ˜`(q) = ∇P`(q) ◦ θ˜`′(q) ◦ (∇P`′(q))−1
≡ r`′,`(θ˜`′(q),q) =

r1`′,`(θ˜`′(q),q)
...
rJ`′,`(θ˜`′(q),q)
 . (14)
Next, Assumption 4 and the incentive compatibility condition for high-types
imply Fθ(t|2) = M∗(q(t; z`); z`), ` = 1, 2 and hence
M∗` (ρ`(t)) := M
∗(ρ(t; z`); z`) = M∗(ρ(t; z`′); z`′) := M∗`′(ρ`′(t)). (15)
Once we determine multivariate quantiles, (15) generalizes (13). Quantiles are
the proper inverse of a distribution function, but defining multivariate quantiles
is not straightforward because of the lack of a natural order in RJ , J ≥ 2. One
way around this problem is to choose an order (or a rank) function and define
the quantiles with respect to that order. I follow the definition of a multivariate
quantiles proposed by Koltchinskii (1997); see Section 2. He shows that if we
choose a continuously differentiable convex function gM(·), then we can define
the quantile function as the inverse of some transformation of gM(·), denoted
as (∂gM)
−1(τ) ∈ RJ for quantile τ ∈ [0, 1]. For this procedure to make sense,
it must be the case that, conditional on the choice of gM(·), there is a one-
to-one mapping between the quantile function and the joint distribution. In
fact, Koltchinskii (1997) shows that for any two distributions M1(·) and M2(·),
the corresponding quantile functions are equal, (∂gM1)
−1(·) = (∂gM2)−1(·), if
and only if M1(·) = M2(·). Henceforth, I assume that such a function gM(·) is
chosen and fixed, then (15) and (1) imply
ρ1(τ) = (∂gM∗1 )
−1(M∗2 (ρ2(τ))) := s2,1(ρ2(τ)), τ ∈ (0, 1). (16)
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This means we can then use
θ˜`(q) = r`′,`(θ˜`′(q),q);
ρ`(τ) = s`′,`(q`′(τ))
to identify θ˜`(·), for either ` = 1 or ` = 2. Since for a q the probability that
{θ ≤ t|Z = z`′} is equal to the probability that {θ ≤ r`′,`(t,q)|Z = z`}, i.e.,
Pr(θ ≤ t|Z = z`′) = Pr(θ ≤ r`′,`(t,q)|Z = z`), it means
ρ`(r`′,`(θ,q)) = s`′,`(ρ`′(θ)); (17)
so if we know ρ`′(·) at some θ then we can identify ρ`(·) at r`′,`(θ,q). As
mentioned earlier, let us normalize v(q0) = q0 for some q0 ∈ Q2 so that we
know {q0, θ0 = θ˜1(q0)}.12 Then this will allow us to identify {q1, θ˜1(q1)} where
q1 = s1,2(q
0) and θ˜1(q
1) = r2,1(θ
0,q1), which further identifies {q2, θ˜1(q2)}
with q2 = s1,2(q
1) and θ˜1(q
2) = r2,1(θ˜1(q
1),q2) and so on. To complete the
identification it must be the case that we can begin with any quantile ρ(τ) ∈ Q2
and identify θ˜(ρ(τ)), possibly by constructing a sequence as above.
To do that we can exploit Assumption 4, which implies that for some θ the
difference (θ − r2,1(θ,q)) measures the resulting change in θ if we switch from
z2 to z1 for a fixed q so that we can trace θ˜(·) as we move back and forth
between z2 and z1. But for identification it is important that these “tracing”
steps come to a halt or, equivalently, for some (fixed point) qˆ ∈ Q2 the mapping
(θ(·) − r2,1(θ, ·)) = 0. For this it is sufficient that the marginal prices at qˆ are
equal (∇P1(qˆ) = ∇P2(qˆ)). Since this is multidimensional problem, it is also
important that the fixed point is attractive (stable), for which it is sufficient
that the slope of of all J components of r`,`′(·) (see (14)) depend only on whether
qj > qˆj or not, irrespective of what j is.
Assumption 5. There exist a qˆ ∈ Q2 such that r`,`′(θ(q), qˆ) = θ(q) and
sgn[(rj`,`′(qj)− qj)(qj − qˆj)] is independent of j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
Both the components of Assumption 5 are technical assumption, but they are
testable, and hence, verifiable from the data. This assumption has been pre-
viously used by D’Haultfœuille and Fe´vrier (2011) to identify a nonseparable
model with discrete instrument and multivariate errors.13 Without loss of gener-
ality I assume the initial normalization to be the fixed point qˆ, so that θ0 = θ˜1(qˆ)
is known. In other words, θ0 is such that q(θ0, z1) = qˆ. And from Assumption
12 We can also normalize some quantile of Fθ(·).
13 I want to thank Xavier D’Haultfœuille for pointing out the connection zto me.
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4, suppose ∇P1(q) ◦∇P2(q)−1 << 1, whenever q << qˆ. Then, for τ th quantile
q(τ) < qˆ:
θ˜1(τ) := (q)
−1(q(τ); z1) = θ˜1(q0) = r1,2(θ˜1(q1),q1)
= [∇P2(q1) ◦ ∇P1(q1)−1] ◦ θ˜1(q1)
= [∇P2(q1) ◦ ∇P1(q1)−1] ◦ [r1,2(θ˜1(q2),q2)]
= [∇P2(q1) ◦ ∇P1(q1)−1] ◦ [∇P2(q2) ◦ ∇P1(q2)−1] ◦ [r1,2(θ˜1(q3),q3)]
...
= rL[θ˜1(s
L
1,2(q(τ))), s
L
1,2(q(τ))]
= lim
L→∞
[∇P2(q1) ◦ ∇P1(q1)−1] ◦ · · · ◦ [∇P2(qL) ◦ ∇P1(qL)−1] ◦ [r1,2(θ˜1(qL+1),qL+1)]
=
{ ∞∏
L=1
∇P2(qL) ◦ ∇P1(qL)−1
}
lim
L→∞
θ˜1(s1,2(q
L+1))
=
{ ∞∏
L=1
∇P2(qL) ◦ ∇P1(qL)−1
}
lim
L→∞
θ0, (18)
where the first equality is simply the definition, the second equality is the
normalization, the third equality follows from (17) with q1 := s1,2(q
0 = ρ(τ))
so that θ˜1(q
0) = r1,2(θ˜1(q
1),q1), and the fourth equality follows from (14).
Repeating this procedure L times leads to the seventh equality. The last equality
uses the following facts: a) qL = s1,2(q
L−1); b) q(τ) < qˆ; c) s1,2(·) is an
increasing continuous function so limL→∞ s1,2(qL) = s1,2(q∞) = s1,2(qˆ); and d)
θ˜1(qˆ) = θ0. Since the quantile τ was arbitrary, we identify θ˜1(·).
Once the quantile function of θ is identified, we can identify C(·, Z) as before.
The optimality condition α(θ) = 0 (Equation (7)) and Equation (9) give
div
{
m∗k(q)
|det(Dθ˜k)(q)|
(θ˜k(q)∇v(q)−∇C(q; zk))
}
= − m
∗(q)
|det(Dθ˜)(q)| .
Differentiating θk ◦ ∇v(q) = ∇Pk(q) with respect to q gives
D∇Pk(q) = Dθ˜k(q) ◦ ∇v(q) + θ˜k(q) ◦D∇v(q)
Dθ˜k(q) ◦ ∇v(q) = D∇Pk(q)− θ˜k(q) ◦ (∇v(q)) ◦ (∇v(q))−1 ◦D∇v(q)
Dθ˜k(q) = D∇Pk(q) ◦ (∇v(q))−1 −∇Pk(q) ◦ (∇v(q))−2 ◦D∇v(q),
which identifies |det(Dθ˜)(q)|. Then, substituting |det(Dθ˜)(q)| in above gives
div
{
m∗(q)
|det(Dθ˜)(q)|(∇P (q)−∇C(q))
}
= − m
∗(q)
|det(Dθ˜)(q)| ,
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(a partial differential equation for C(·, zk)), with boundary condition
m∗k(q)
|det(Dθ˜k)(q)|
(∇C(q; zk)−∇Pk(q)) · −→n (∇Pk(q)) = 0, ∀q ∈ ∂Q2.
This PDE has a unique solution C(q), and hence, we have the following result:
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumptions 1-(i)–(iv-c) and (v) and Assumptions 2–5,
[Fθ(·|2),v(·), C(·;Z)] are identified.
To identify the density fθ(·|1) we can use Theorem 4.2, except now the gross
utility function is
∑
j∈[J ] θjX1jvj(qj, X2). Therefore, to account for v(·, X2), we
need to be able to extend the utility function from Q2 to Q2 ∪ Q1. For the
identification strategy, then, if v(·) is a real analytic, like the cost function,
then we can extend the domain of v(·) to include Q1.
Assumption 6. Let the utility function v(·, X2) be a real analytic function.
Then, under Assumption 6, we can change the unit of measurement from q to
q˜ ≡ v(q, X2), then apply Theorem 4.2 with gross utility as
∑
j∈[J ] θjXj q˜j.
4.4. Overidentification. Now that we know identification depends on how
many cost shifters we have and whether or not the gradient of the pricing
function cross, the next step is analyze the effect of observed characteristics
X on identification. Before we begin, let us assume that the nonlinear utility
model is identified. Then I ask the following question: if the utility function
depends on X, and X is independent of θ is the model over identified?
Lemma 3. Consider the optimal allocation rule restricted for high types S2θ ,
where q = ρ(θ,X, z`) := ρ`(θ,X). Suppose Fθ(·|2) and Mq|X,Z(·|·, ·) have finite
second moments. Then the CDF Fθ(·|2) is over identified.
Proof. From the previous results Fθ(·|2) and Mq|X,Z(·|X) are nonparametrically
identified. Since Z is observed, we can suppress the notation. We want to
use the data {q, X}, the knowledge of Fθ(·|2), and the truncated distribution
M∗q|X(·|X) to identify ρ(·, X). Let L(S2θ , Q2) be the set of joint distribution
L(q, θ) with marginals defined as∫
S2θ
L(q, θ)dθ = M∗q|X(q|·);
∫
Q2X
L(q, θ)dq = Fθ(θ|2). (19)
To that end, consider the following optimization problem:
min
L(q,θ)∈L
E(|q− θ|2|X).
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In other words, given two sets S2θ and Q2X of equal volume, we want to find the
optimal volume-preserving map between them, where optimality is measured
against cost function |θ − q|2. If the observed q ∈ Q2 were generated under
equilibrium, then the solution will map q to the right θ such that q = ρ(θ;X),
for a fixed X. The minimization problem is equivalent to
max
L(q,θ)∈L
E(θ · q|X),
such that the solution maximizes the (conditional) covariance between θ and
q. Either when we minimize the quadratic distance or the covariance, our
objective is to find an optimal way to “transport” q to θ. Let δ[·] be a Dirac
measure or a degenerate distribution. Brenier (1991) and McCann (1995) show
that that there exists a unique convex function Γ(q, X) such that dL(q, θ) =
dM∗q|X(q)δ[θ = ∇qΓ(q, X)] is the solution. Therefore for all q ∈ Q2X we can
determine its inverse θ = ∇qΓ(q, X), which identifies Fθ(·|2). 
Therefore we can use Γ(q, X) to test the validity of the supply-side equilibrium.
There are many ways to think of a “specification test.” One way is by veri-
fying that using ∇qΓ(q, X) (instead of θ) in Equation (4) leads to the same
equilibrium ρ(θ;X).
5. Model Restrictions
In this section I derive the restrictions imposed by the model on observables
under Assumption 1-(iv) –a, b, and c, respectively. These restrictions can be
used to test the model validity. For every agent we observe [pi,qi, Xi] and for the
seller we observe {z1, z2}. From the model pi and qi are given by p = P`(q, z`)
and q = ρ`(θ, z`). Specifically, suppose a researcher observes a sequence of price
and quantity data, and some agents and cost characteristics. Does there exist
any possibility to rationalize the data such that the underlying screening model
is optimal when the utility function satisfies Assumption 1-(iv-a) (Model 1),
Assumption 1-(iv-b) (Model 2), or Assumption 1-(iv-c) (Model 3)? In all three
models we ask, in the presence of multidimensional asymmetric information,
what are the restrictions on the sequence of data (Z,Xi, {qi, pi}) we can test if
and only if it is generated by an optimal screening model, without knowing the
cost function, the type distribution, and for Model 3 the utility function? We
say that a distribution of the observables is rationalized by a model if and only
if it satisfies all the restrictions of the model. In other words, a distribution of
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the observables is rationalized if and only if there is a structure (not necessarily
unique) in the model that generates such a distribution.
Let D1 = (q, p), D2 = (q, p,X1), D3 = (q, p,X, Z) distributed, respectively,
as ΨD`(·), ` = 1, 2, 3, and let
M1 = {(Fθ(·), C(·)) ∈ F × C : satisfy Assumption 1− (i)− (iv − a), (v)}
M2 = {(Fθ(·), C(·)) ∈ F × C : satisfy Assumption 1− (i)− (iv − b), (v)}
M3 = {(Fθ(·), C(·, Z)) ∈ F × CZ : satisfy Assumptions 1− (i)− (iv − c), (v), 3 and 4}
Define the following conditions:
C1. ΨD1(·) = δ[p = P (q)]×M(q), with density m(q) > 0 for all q ∈ Q1 ∪Q2.
C2. There is a subset Q1 ( Q which is a J − 1 dimensional flat (hyperplane)
in RJ+.
C3. p = P (q) has non-vanishing gradient and Hessian for all q ∈ Q2.
C4. Let {W} := {∇P (q) : q ∈ Q2}. Then FW (w) = Pr(W ≤ w) = M∗(q) and
let m∗(·) > 0 be he density of M∗(·)
C5. Let C(·) be the solution of the differential equation
div
{
m∗(q)
|det(D∇P (q))|(∇P (q)−∇C(q))
}
= − m
∗(q)
|det(D∇P (q))| , (20)
with boundary conditions
m∗(q)
|det(D∇P (q))|(∇C(q)−∇P (q)) ·
−→n (∇P (q)) = 0.
5.1. Linear Utility. For every consumer we observe D1, and the objective is
to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions on the joint distribution
ΨD1(·, ·) for it to be rationalized by model M1.
Lemma 5.1. If M1 rationalizes ΨD1(·) then ΨD1(·) satisfies conditions C1.−
C5. Conversely, if Fθ(·|0) and Fθ(·|1) are known and ΨD1(·) satisfies the C1.−
C5 then there is a model M1 that generates D1.
Proof. If. Since Fθ(·) is such that the density fθ(·) > 0 everywhere on Sθ
and the equilibrium allocation rule ρ : Sθ → Q is onto, and continuous, the
CDF M(q) is well defined and the density m(q) > 0. Moreover, since the
equilibrium allocation rule is deterministic, for every q there is only one price
P (q), hence the Dirac measure, which completes C1. Rochet-Chone´ shows that
in equilibrium the bunching set Q1 is nonempty, and hence m(q) > 0 for all
q ∈ Q1. Moreover, the allocation rule ρ : S1θ → Q1 is not bijective, and as
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a result, Q1 as a subset of RJ+ is flat, which completes C2. The optimality
condition for the types that are perfectly screened is θ = ∇P (q) := θ˜(q),
and incentive compatibility implies the indirect utility function is convex and
hence P (q) has non-vanishing gradient and Hessian, which completes C3. Then,
M∗(q) = Pr(q ≤ q) = Pr(∇P (q) ≤ ∇P (q)) = Pr(W ≤ w) = FW (w), hence C4.
Finally, if we use (9) to replace fθ(·) in α(θ) = 0,∀θ ∈ S2θ with the boundary
condition β(θ) = 0,∀θ ∈ ∂S2θ ∩ ∂Sθ we get C5.
Only if. Now, we show that if ΨD1(·) satisfies all C1.− C5. conditions listed
above then we can determine a model M1 that rationalizes ΨD1(·). Let C(·)
satisfy C5, then we can determine the cost function C(·). Moreover, it is real
analytic so it can be extended uniquely to all Q. From C4. we can determine
the vector W , which is also the type θ, and it satisfies the first-order opti-
mality condition. Thus, the indirect utility of the type θ that corresponds
to the choices q ∈ Q2 is convex and hence satisfies the incentive compat-
ibility constraint. Moreover, since m∗(q) > 0 the density fθ(·|2) > 0 and
Fθ(·|2) =
∫
θ∈{W :=∇P (q),q∈Q2} fθ(θ|2)dθ. As far as Fθ(·|1) is concerned, we can
simply ignore bunching and define Fθ(θ) = M(q|q ∈ Q1) where θ = ∇P (q). 
5.2. Bi-Linear Utility. Now I consider the case of bi-linear utility function.
Since X2 is redundant information, we can ignore it. The only difference be-
tween this and the previous model is now there is X2. So to save more nota-
tions, I slightly abuse notations and use the same conditions C1. − C5., ex-
cept now they are understood with respect to D2. For instance, C1. becomes
ΨD2(·) = δ[p = P (q;X1)]×M(q)×ΨX1 .
Lemma 5.2. If M2 rationalizes ΨD2(·) then ΨD2(·) satisfies conditions C1.−
C5. Conversely, if Fθ(·|0) is known, dim(X1) = dim(q) = J , and ΨD2(·)
satisfies C1.− C5 then there is a model M2 that generates D2.
The proof of this lemma is very similar to that of Lemma 5.2, except in here
the menu (allocation and prices) depend on X1 but the cost function and the
type CDF do not, and the conditional density fθ(·|1) can be determined from
the data. In view of space I omit the proof.
5.3. Nonlinear Utility. Finally, I consider the case of nonlinear utility. Before
I proceed, I introduce two more conditions.
C4′. If ρτ (X2, Z) is the τ ∈ [0, 1] quantile of q ∈ Q2X2,Z then ρτ (·, z1) = ρτ (·, z2).
C6. The truncated distribution of choices M∗q|X,Z(·|·, ·) has finite second moment,
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and for a given Z = z` (henceforth suppressed) the solution of
max
L(q,θ)∈L(Q2,S2θ )
E(θ · q|X),
where L(Q2,S2θ ) is as defined in (19) is given by a mapping θ = ∇qΓ(q, X) for
some convex function Γ(q, X) such that it solves the optimality condition (4).
So with nonlinear utility, condition C4′. replaces condition C4., and as with
the bi-linear utility, the conditions should be interpreted as being conditioned
on both X and Z wherever appropriate.
Lemma 5.3. Let Fθ(·|2) have finite second moment. If M3 rationalizes ΨD3(·)
then ΨD3(·) satisfies C1.−C3., C4.′−C7. Conversely, if Fθ(·|0), and a quantile
θ˜(qτ ) is known, dim(X1) = dim(q) = J,Q
2
X,zk
= Q2X,zk′ (common support)
and ΨD3(·) satisfies C1. − C3., C4.′ − C6., then there exists a model M3 that
rationalizes ΨD3(·).
Proof. If. The CDF is Fθ(·) with density fθ(·) > 0 everywhere on the support
Sθ. Moreover, the equilibrium allocation rule ρ : Sθ ×X × Z → Q is onto and
continuous for given (X,Z). Therefore the CDF Mq|X,Z(·|·, ·) is a push forward
of Fθ(·) given (X,Z). Since Q = Q2(X,Z) ∪Q1(X,Z) ∪{q0} the (truncated) density
mq|X,Z(q|·, ·) > 0 for all q ∈ Q2(X,Z)∪Q1(X,Z). In equilibrium, for a given (q, X, Z)
the pricing function is deterministic, therefore the distribution is degenerate at
p = P (q;X,Z), i.e., a Dirac measure. This completes C1. For C2. note that
the allocation rule is not bijective, and as a result ρ(S1θ ;X,Z) = Q1 ( RJ+
is a hyperplane. For the high-types, optimality requires the marginal utility
θ ·v(q;X2) is equal to the marginal price P (q;X,Z), and since v(·;X2) has non-
vanishing Hessian, P (·;X,Z) also has non-vanishing gradient ∇P (·;X,Z) and
Hessian, which completes C3. Since Z |= θ, using Equation (15) gives Fθ(ξ|2) =
Mq|X,Z(ρ1(ξ)|X, z1) = Mq|X,Z(ρ2(ξ)|X, z2), as desired for C4′. The condition C5.
follows once we replace m∗(·) and P (q) in (20) with m∗q|X,Z(·|·, ·) and P (q;X,Z),
respectively, and observe that for any pair (X,Z) the equilibrium for high-type
is given by α(θ) = 0. Since Fθ(·|2) is known and M∗q|X,Z(·) is determined,
condition C6. follows from Lemma 3.
Only if. We want to show that if ΨD3(·) satisfies all conditions in the state-
ment, then we can construct a modelM3 that rationalizes ΨD3(·). For Z = zk,
using condition C6. we can determine two cost functions C(·, z1) and C(·, z2).
Since (20) is applicable only to Q2X,Z , we need to extend the domain of the cost
function. Of many ways to extend the domain, the simplest is to assume that
the cost is quadratic, i.e., C(q;X,Z) = 1/2
∑J
j=1 q
2
j for all q ∈ Q1X,Z ∪ {q0}.
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Using the exclusion restriction and (18) for all q ∈ Q2X,Z , we can determine
the function θ˜(qτ ;Z = zk) along a set Q˜
2
X,Z ⊆ Q2X,Z for k = 1, 2. If the set
Q˜2X,Z is a dense subset then there is a unique extension of θ˜(·; ·) over all Q2X,Z .
If not, then, let us linearly extend the function to the entire domain of Q2X,Z .
Then, define v(q;X2) = ∇P (q;X,Z) ◦ (θ˜k(q))−1. Finally, to extend the func-
tion to Q, we can assume that each function vj(qj;X) = q
1/2
j , j = 1, . . . , J
for all q ∈ Q1X,Z ∪ {q0}. As far as Fθ(·|1) is concerned, we can simply ig-
nore bunching and define Fθ(θ) = M(q|q ∈ Q1) where q ∈ Q1 is such that
θ = ∇P (q;X,Z) ◦ (v(q;X2))−1. Since the probability of q = {q0},q ∈ Q1X,Z
and q ∈ Q2X,Z is equal to the probability of θ ∈ S0θ , θ ∈ S1θ and θ ∈ S2θ , re-
spectively, we can determine Fθ(·). It is then straightforward to verify that the
triplet thus constructed belongs to M3. 
6. Discussion
6.1. Unobserved Taste Shifter. So far I have assumed that consumer’s tastes
are completely characterized by a vector θ. But suppose there is an unobserved
market level taste shifter Y that scales the taste for all consumers, and, as such,
is observed by all consumers and the seller but not the econometrician.
Assumption 7. Let
(1) The random variables (θ, Y ) are distributed on Sθ × R++ according to
the CDF Fθ,Y (·, ·) such that Pr(θ ≤ θ0, Y ≤ y0) = Fθ,Y (θ0, y0).
(2) Let θ∗ := Y × θ be such that θ∗ ∼ Fθ∗|Y (·|y) = Fθ∗(·) and E(log Y ) = 0.
Let S2θ∗|Y denote the types that are perfectly screened. Then, under assumption
7, optimality of these types means θ∗i = ∇P (qi), and since θ∗i = θiy, i ∈ [N2],
we want to identify Fθ(·) and FY (·) from above. Dividing [N2] into two parts
and reindexing {1, . . . , N21} and {1, . . . , N22} and taking the log of the above
we get
log θ∗ij = log θij + log Y, ij = 1, . . . N2j, j = 1, 2.
Let Ch(·, ·) be the joint characteristic function of (log θi1 , log θi2) and Ch1(·, ·)
be the partial derivative of this characteristic function with respect to the first
component. Similarly, let Chlog Y (·) and Chlog θj(·) denote characteristic func-
tions of log Y and log θj, which is the shorthand for θij , ij ∈ [N2j]. Then from
Kotlarski (1966):
Chlog Y (ξ) = exp
(∫ ξ
0
Ch1(0, t)
Ch(0, t)
dt
)
− itE[log θ1].
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Then the characteristic function of Chlog θ1(ξ) =
Ch(ξ,0)
Chlog Y (ξ)
, which identifies Fθ(·).
Lemma 6.1. Under Assumption 7, the model [Fθ(·), FY (·), C(·),v(·)] with un-
observed heterogeneity is identified.
6.2. Measurement Errors. So far, we have assumed that the econometrician
observes both the transfers and the contract characteristics without error. Such
an assumption could be strong in some environments. Sometimes it is hard
to measure the transfers (wages, prices, etc.), and sometimes, it is hard to
measure different attributes of contracts. For instance given a monopoly who
sells differentiated products, it is possible that some, if not all, of the attributes
of the product are measured with error. In this subsection we allow data to be
measured with error.
6.2.1. Measurement Error in Prices. I begin by considering the case in which
only the transfers are measured with error and subsequently consider the case in
which only the contract choices are measured with error. If only the prices are
measured with additive error, and if the error is independent of the true price,
then the model is still identified. The intuition behind this is simple. When
choices {q} are observed without error, but only prices are observed with error,
and if this error is additively separable and independent of the true prices, i.e.,
P ε(q) = P (q) + ε, P (q) |= ε,
then the observed marginal prices∇P ε(·) and the true marginal prices∇P (·) are
the same, which means the previous identification arguments are still applicable.
Lemma 6.2. If {P ε = P + ε} is observed, where P is the price and P |= ε is
the measurement error, then the model parameters [Fθ(·), C(·)] are identified.
6.2.2. Measurement Error in Choices. Now consider a case where the choices
q’s are observed with error. Furthermore, let’s suppose that there is one (di-
mensional) error η ∈ R+ that affects all J characteristics. In other words, we
envision a situation where there is one η for each consumer, and instead of the
choice qi we only measure q
η = q + η · 1, where 1 is J− dimensional vector
of ones. Since there is no reason why each component q should have a unique
measurement error associated with it, having one error unique to each consumer
choice seems more natural in this environment. We also assume that η |= q and
η ∼ Fη(·). The data is then {P,qη} pair for every consumer with type θ ∈ S2θ .
Then P = P (q) = P (qη − η · 1) implies ∇P (q) 6= ∇P (qη), which means with-
out correcting for η the taste parameter θ cannot be identified. Following the
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same logic as Lemma 6.1, we can identify Fη(·), but that still does not mean we
can identify θ, because we have J + 1 unknowns and only J equation for each
consumer.
Lemma 6.3. If {qη = q + η · 1} is observed, where η |= q is the measurement
error then the model [Fθ(·), C(·)] cannot be identified.
6.3. Unobserved Product Characteristic. In this section I extend the lin-
ear utility model to allow for an unobserved product characteristic. Suppose we
observe two bundles q and q′ where the former dominates the latter q >> q′
and P (q) ≤ P (q′), with positive demand for both. This pattern suggests that
either the model is inappropriate, and hence we can reject the Rochet-Chone´
model as a good description of the data generating process, or that some product
characteristic is missing in the data. Let Y˜ ∈ R+ denote such a characteristic
that is observed only by the consumers and the seller, and let θy˜ be consumer’s
taste for this characteristic. The net utility when a (new) type (θ1, . . . , θJ , θy˜)
chooses {q} ∪ {Y˜ } bundle and pays P is given by
V (q, Y˜ ; θ, θy˜) = θ · q + θy˜Y˜ − P.
Introducing Y˜ can rationalize the above anomaly with q and q′ because the
consumer is comparing (q, Y˜ ) and (q′, Y˜ ′) and not just q and q′, which leads
to the following econometrics model:
P = P (q, Y˜ )(
q
Y˜
)
= ρ(θ1, . . . , θJ , θy˜, Fθ,θy˜ , C), (21)
where (Y, P (·, ·), Fθ,θy(·, ·), C(·)) are unknown. Since the product characteristics
are endogenous, the observed product characteristics are correlated with the
unobserved characteristic Y˜ and hence the model cannot be identified without
further restrictions. For example, Bajari and Benkard (2005) allow for one
dimensional unobserved product characteristics, as above, but only under the
restrictions that: θy˜ ≡ 1, so all consumers value the missing characteristic the
same way; and Y˜ |= q, so that the missing characteristic is exogenous. As can be
seen, both these assumptions are too strong to be useful in the context where the
product characteristics are endogenous and consumer preference heterogeneity
includes heterogeneity towards the missing characteristics.
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6.4. Discrete Options. The identification arguments rely on observing con-
tinuous (or a continuum) of many options for the consumers. This is not an
assumption I made, but an outcome of the seller ’s maximization problem: the
more the seller can discriminate, the better the revenue, as long as it respects
incentive compatibility constraints. There can be instances where we observe
only discrete (very few) options (Wilson, 1993) but the theory is silent about
why a seller would offer fewer (than the optimal number of) options, without
imposing arbitrary size restrictions on the consumer type space Θ. If the set
Q is discrete but Θ is continuous, then the identification results do not apply.
Without a theory model to rationalize the supply side, I would then have to re-
sort to using some form of exclusion restriction for identification. For instance,
it seems safe to conjecture that we can use variation in consumer characteristics
to extend Theorem 4.2 to identify f(θ|1) and f(θ|2), but not the cost function.
In view of this lacuna in the theory, researchers have started to estimate the
loss of payoff from using simpler contracts and find that in some cases the loss
is small. For example, Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011) find that the revenue
loss of using a two-part tariff instead of a multi-part tariff is small. If the loss
of offering simple (or few options) is not too much, but if there is a “menu
cost” (for the lack of better term) in offering multiple options, then it stands to
reason that offering fewer options could be optimal for the seller. Such menu-
cost could be a proxy for the cost of marketing – it is easier and hence cheaper
to sell 10 options than 50 options. Although this argument is intuitive, it is not
clear how one can make this menu-cost operable in a multidimensional adverse
selection environment and achieve point identification. There is so little research
in this area that it is not obvious what sort of menu-cost will generate a sharp
prediction about the exact number of options in the data.
In the discussion above, finite or discrete options is meant to denote cases
where there are indeed very few options. If the seller offers numerous discrete
options then we might be able to fit in a continuous function to “fill the gap”
and treat the fitted function as if it were a continuous equilibrium outcome and
apply the previous results. For example, Aryal (2013) observes more than 200
ad choices and fits a nonlinear tariff function and uses that for identification.
Similarly, in the telecommunication market of Figure 1, if we define a product
as a bundle of ex-post usage of voice data and SMS then we can make use of
heterogeneity in ex-post usage to treat the options as if they were continuous.
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The right approach depends on the nature of the market and the data, and
whether or not we want to abandon point identification in favor of partial iden-
tification. In multi-unit auctions, for example, bidders often submit very few
steps, and Kastl (2011), and more recently Cassola, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2013),
posit that it could be because bidders incur an additional cost when submitting
a bid having more steps. With bid-submission cost, however, their model can
only be partially identified. Studying the failure of point identification of the
Rochet-Chone´ model with cost of offering multiple options is an important and
challenging problem and needs a treatment that goes beyond the scope of this
paper.
7. Conclusion
In this paper I study the identification of a screening model studied by Rochet
and Chone´ (1998) where consumers have multidimensional private information.
I show that if the utility is linear or bi-linear, as is often used in empirical indus-
trial organization literature, then we can use the optimality of both the supply
side and the demand side to nonparametrically identify the multidimensional
unobserved consumer taste distribution and the cost function of the seller. The
key to identification is to exploit equilibrium bijection between the unobserved
types and observed choices and the fact that in equilibrium, the consumer will
choose a bundle that equates marginal utility to marginal prices. When pri-
vate information is multidimensional, however, the allocation rule need not be
bijective for all types. For those medium-types who are bunched, I show that
if we have information about consumers’ socioeconomic and demographic char-
acteristics that are independent of the types, and if there are as many such
characteristics as products, the joint density of types can be identified.
When utility is nonlinear, having a binary and exogenous cost shifter is suf-
ficient for identification. I also show that with nonlinear utility if we have
independent consumer characteristics then the model is over identified, which
can be used to test the validity of supply-side optimality. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study that provides a way to test optimality of
equilibrium in a principal-agent model. Furthermore, I characterize all testable
restrictions of the model on the data and extend the identification to consider
measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity.
One of the area for future extension would be to allow multiple sellers, for
example, the cable television market of Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) where
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consumers’ preferences for multiple channels is private information, and as men-
tioned above, to study the effect of observing discrete options on identification.
Much like the problems with discrete options, there are difficulties associated
with competition, even with one-dimensional private information; see Epstein
and Peters (1999); Martimort and Stole (2002); and Yang and Ye (2008). Laf-
font, Maskin, and Rochet (1987) propose an aggregation technique that has been
used in empirical settings by Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) and Aryal (2013) but
can be used only with bi-dimensional types. Another method is to use the gener-
alized Hotelling model (Rochet and Stole, 2002; Bonatti, 2011), which is similar
to Bresnahan (1987), if, like Bresnahan (1987), we can find a one-dimensional
(hedonic) aggregator of the multidimensional product characteristics.
As far as the estimation is concerned, it is easy to see that the only difficulty
arises when the utility function is nonlinear in product quality. When the util-
ity is linear or bi-linear, (nonparametric) estimation is straightforward, as long
as one is careful about the asymptotic properties of the estimator, because of
multiple steps involved, and bandwidth choice for the Fourier inversion. Having
said that, much needs to be done in this field, both in identification and estima-
tion of the nonlinear utility, and my hope is that this paper will provide some
useful insights as to how to “take” a seemingly complicated model to data.
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